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Keeping the Outsiders Out: Civil 
Rights, The "Non-Issue" of the 
1992 Presidential Election 
Mark Stern, University of Central Florida 
Overview 
Civil rights, an issue that critically aided the Reagan-Bush 
elections of the 1980's, practically disappeared from the presidential 
election issue agenda of 1992. This would appear to be a remarkable 
occurrence, given the importance of this issue to Republican 
presidential electoral hopes during the past two decades and that a major 
urban riot. dominated by black participants, occurred during the 1992 
presidential election year. This paper examines why and how civil 
rights became a "non-issue," i.e., an issue not perceived as part of the 
political agenda, during the 1992 presidential campaign. The emphasis 
is on the strategy of the Democratic presidential nominee, Bill Clinton, 
and how he sought to mute the civil rights issue during the 1992 
presidential campaign. 
In recent decades civil rights issues created a critical wedge between 
major elements of the traditional New Deal Democratic coalition. This 
wedge, between African-Americans and working-class whites, 
substantially contributed to the Republican presidential election 
victories of the previous decade. Many analysts and political strategists 
believed that the GOP, with the help of Democratic defectors, had 
forged a new and possibly durable winning presidential electoral 
coalition. Therefore, this paper also looks at how President George 
Bush backed away from the civil rights issue during the campaign on 
1992. 
Introduction 
Politicians are preoccupied with creating and maintaining winning 
political coalitions. It is the winning coalition that gets to hold office 
and office is the key to political power. 1 But electoral coalitions 
1The seminal monograph in this area, from which there has flowed an 
outpouring of contemporary work on coalition theory and coalition 
building, is William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New 
Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1963). 
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change over time, as they are inherently unstable.2 V. 0. Key, Jr.'s 
seminal work on political alignments has served as the major 
framework for the analysis of electoral coalition change and 
development.3 Key modified and extended his argument on the nature of 
critical elections and changes in electoral coalition alignments, as have 
other scholars. But the fact that political change is, as Key noted, the 
result of election processes that "operate inexorably ... election after 
election to form new party alignments and to build new party 
groupings," remains central to an understanding of democratic politics.4 
E. E. Schattschneider added to Key's analysis by pointing out that 
periods of realignment occur not only with a change in party 
composition, but also with a transformation of "the agenda of American 
politics." That is, the current issue battle lines are replaced with new 
issues and new party battle lines about these issues.5 Politicians often 
operate as entrepreneurs who create or recreate issues to attract votes.6 
It is usually through the vehicle of elections that politicians operate as 
issue entrepreneurs. Politicians use issues to garner votes. As 
Anthony Downs succinctly stated the case: "parties formulate policies 
in order to win elections .... "7 Elections therefore provide a periodicity 
to changes in the public policy agenda; they serve as a focus for 
politicians to bring forward issues as they seek to attract the votes 
necessary to win office. 8 
2William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (San Francisco, Ca.: 
Freeman, 1982), p. 209. 
3V. 0 . Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 
(1959): 13- 18. 
4V. 0. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," Journal of 
Politics 21 (1959) : 198-210. The literature on political realignment 
appears to be ever-developing. A few of the more prominent studies in this 
area include: Byron E. Shafer, ed., The End of RealignmenJ? (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1991); James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the 
Party System, (rev . ed. ; Washington , D.C.: Brookings, 1983); Everett Carl 
Ladd, Jr . with Charles Hadley, Transformation of the Party System (2nd ed .; 
New York: Norton, 1978; John R. Petrocik, Party Coalitions (Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press, 1971); Walter Dean Burnham , Critical 
Elections (New York: Norton, 1970). 
5E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (Hinsdale, Ill.: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1960, 1976), p. 88. 
6John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1984), pp. 129-30; Nelson W. Polsby, Political Innovation 
in America (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 161; Jack L. 
Walker, "Performance Gaps, Policy Research , and Political Entrepreneurs," 
Policy Studies Journal 3 (1974): 112-116. 
7 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: 
Harrier & Row, 1957), p . 28. 
Pols by, pp . 165-74. 
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Of course, the public must respond to the politicians' entreaties for 
change, if change is to talce place. James L. Sundquist points out that a 
necessary condition for political realignment to talce place is that the 
electorate must polarize itself on an issue and politicians must publicly 
contest the issue and maintain visibly differing polar positions. 9 The 
heart of politics in democracies, according to Schattschneider, rests on 
these assumptions and the assumption that the majority party will 
operate to implement its policy pledges once it is in office. He writes: 
"Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing 
leaders and organiz.ations define the alternatives of public policy in such 
a way that the public can participate in the decision-making 
process .... "10 
However, important issues may well be ignored in public debate, 
or defined out of the political arena. When this occurs, the weakest 
groups and individuals in society are often the losers. To 
Schattschneider, the "socialization of conflict," the placement of issues 
on the public policy debate agenda, is a critical element in politics, 
especially for those who are already among the weakest members of 
society. They typically want to involve more people in an issue 
debate, to tip the odds and move the balance of forces toward their 
position on the issue. 11 
The New Deal realignment was built around the highly vocal and 
visible opposition of the monied, conservative economic interests 
against the Democratic party's commitment to the disadvantaged and 
generally weaker elements of American society. The New Deal 
coalition, the alliance that was forged by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 
wake of the 1932 presidential election, established the Democratic party 
as the national majority party. The New Deal coalition has been so 
durable that is has become part of American folklore, and it is so well 
known that its constituent groupings--Catholics, Jews, union members, 
big-city populations, poor people, and African-Americans--are broadly 
familiar to the mass public. Yet this coalition has undergone changes. 
The most notable shifts have been the defection of the white South and, 
more recently, non-southern working class whites from the Democratic 
alliance, and the emergence of the black southerner within the alliance. 
There is little doubt that in the 1960's both the partisan coalitions 
and the issues on which electoral outcomes had depended since the 
1930's shifted dramatically. There is solid evidence that the 1964 
presidential election served as a critical event for this occurrence, and 
9Sundquist, p. 14. 
lOSchattschneider, p. 141. 
11Schattschneider, 7, 40. An extension of this argument is made in 
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An 
Analytic Framework," American Political Science Review, 51 (1957): 632-
42. 
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that divisions over the pace, breadth and depth of governmental action 
in civil rights was a major cause of this shift. 12 The New Deal 
coalition was built around the subordination of ethnic, regional and 
other differences to a class-based alliance. Carmines and Stimson's 
perceptive analysis of electoral alignment in the wake of the 1964 
presidential election demonstrates that racial issues are now generally 
subordinate to class issues in defining political realities for the mass 
public. They find that "racial issues, in sum, seem not only to be at 
the core of the [recent] increase in mass issue consistency but also to 
provide a significant and stable element in the meaning of 
liberal/conservative political beliefs." 13 Since 1968, Gerald Pomper 
finds, "all partisan groups recognized the existence of different party 
positions on this [racial] issue and all were convinced that the 
Democrats favor greater government action on civil rights than do the 
Republicans." 14 The consequences of these changes in public attitudes 
were not only noted by the Republicans but acted upon. 
Kevin Phillips, a Nixon aide in the 1968 campaign, argued in The 
Emerging Republican Majority that the GOP had to redefine the race 
issue, from civil rights for blacks to misuse of funds and government 
efforts on behalf of wasteful economic programs and morally incorrect 
social policies. This would tum the race issue around and drive lower-
class whites, Catholics, and others out of the party of Roosevelt and 
into the Republican fold. 15 Phillips and other GOP strategists who 
subsequently took this position never argued that they were for racial 
discrimination or against blacks being treated equally. Instead they 
claimed they were for equal treatment of all Americans and for "good" 
values. They were against reverse discrimination, the coddling of 
criminals, the acceptance or encouragement of out-of-wedlock births and 
welfare dependency. In 1982, Phillips wrote of a "New Right" of 
"populist-conservative groups emphasizing social issues, religious and 
cultural alienation, anti-elite rhetoric, lower-middle-class constituencies, 
populist fund-raising and plebiscitary opinion mobilization." This New 
Right sees itself as an inheritor of George Wallace's supporters, without 
any link to the racism that he espoused in the 1960's.16 
12Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Robert Huckfeldt and Carol 
Weitzel Kohfeld, Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics 
(Urbana, Ill .: University of Illinois Press, 1989). 
13Carmines and Stimson, p. 134. 
14Gerald M . Pomper, "Toward A Responsible Two-Party System: What, 
Again?" Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 932. 
15Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, 
N.Y.: 1969). 
16Kevin P. Phillips, Post-Conservative America (New York: Random 
House, 1982), pp. 47 -49 . 
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In the 1980's Phillips' program of action was put into place as 
Ronald Reagan and the New Right gained control of the presidential 
wing of the Republican party. The Reagan 1980 and 1984 election 
strategies and the Bush 1988 election strategy were consistent with 
Phillips' plan and carried the day for the GOP. In the current era of 
American politics, Huckfeldt and Kohfeld argue, "race frequently serves 
as a wedge that disrupts lower-class [black and white] coalitions, 
thereby driving out class in our political arrangements." And, "race 
continues to be the most important line of conflict in American 
electoral politics. "17 This wedge was basic to the emergence of 
Republican presidential majorities during the 1980's. 
Edsall and Edsall 's 1991 study of the Reagan electoral strategy finds 
that "race has fueled the ascendancy of the presidential wing of the 
Republican party and has blocked Democratic efforts to revive a 
majority coalition. "18 In recent presidential elections, the more 
Democratic party identifiers perceived that the GOP was opposed to aid 
to minorities, the more likely they were to defect to the Republican 
candidate. The Democratic party was consistently perceived as 
supportive of such aid, and this was opposed by many of their core 
partisan supporters. 19 In every state-wide 1990 election in which the 
GOP made race a factor--through the use of the term "quotas" or the 
linkage of a candidate to Jesse Jackson, who is perceived as an 
aggressive and overt defender of racial preferences for African-
Americans--the Republican candidate emerged the winner.20 
The Edsalls' study of the contemporary political party battle 
concludes, "race will remain an exceptionally divisive force in politics 
as long as the debate is couched in covert language and in coded 
symbols." This divisiveness advantages the Republicans who continue 
to oppose programs centered on minority preferences while the 
Democrats support such programs.21 However, Herbert Asher argues, 
"for preferential treatment [of minorities] to become a critical issue, the 
Democratic party and its candidates would have to advocate a set of 
measures that are seen as favoring minorities at the expense of 
whites .... "22 
Both the Republicans and the Democrats pulled back from their 
17Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, pp. ix, 1. 
18Toomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), p. 256. 
19Robert Weissberg, 'The Democratic Party and the Conflict Over Racial 
Policy," in Benjamin Ginsberg and Alan Stone, eds., Do Elections Matter? 
(2nd ed.; Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1991), p. 162. 
20Edsall and Edsall, p. 257. 
21Edsall and Edsall, pp. 281, 257, 186. 
22Herbert B. Asher, Presidential Elections and American Politics (5th 
ed.; Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1992), 325-326. 
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respective pos1ltons on major civil rights legislation as the 1992 
presidential election approached. 23 Yet, just prior to the presidential 
election year it appeared that both major parties were going to harden 
their polar positions on this issue. In 1990 President Bush vetoed a 
proposed Civil Rights Act after denouncing it as a "quotas" bill. His 
veto was upheld with the overwhelming support of the GOP 
congressional delegation. In 1991, after ten months of bitter partisan 
debate, the Congress, with the President's blessing, passed a new Civil 
Rights Act--with large majorities of both parties supporting the 
legislation. The near-election of David Duke, the former Nazi turned 
Republican, to the governorship of Louisiana changed the political 
atmosphere. A major public outcry over Duke's association with the 
GOP convinced many moderate Republicans that the party had gone too 
far in its anti-civil rights advocacy. 
Several key Republican Senators, led by John Warner of Virginia, 
told the President that they might lose their reelection campaigns if 
moderate whites in their states defected from the GOP because the party 
was advocating a civil rights position that was too strident. The Duke-
GOP connection symbolized a radicalism that was unacceptable to 
many Americans. President Bush was warned that several Republican 
senators up for reelection in 1992 would have to vote for the 
Democratic version of the legislation if he could not work out a 
compromise. Subsequently, after extensive debate within the White 
House, the President agreed that he could revise his position and a new 
compromise on this bill could be negotiated . He agreed to a bipartisan 
interpretive memorandum that waffled on the meaning of the affirmative 
action sections of the proposal. 
The GOP gamble on polarizing the electorate over race was 
suspended. On the Democratic side, the original 1990 bill was 
weakened with language which specifically forbade the use of quotas. 
In addition, a lower limit was placed on awards possible for punitive 
damages when intent to discriminate was not proven. Thus both the 
GOP's and the Democrats' hard-line positions on this issue were muted. 
Partisan differences over civil rights were no longer as clear as they had 
been. 
The 1992 Election and Civil Rights 
For Bill Clinton and his allies, civil rights, the issue that had 
devastated the Roosevelt coalition in recent years, was to be side-
23 An analysis of the inter-party and intra-party Republican struggle over 
the proposed 1990 civil rights legislation and the 1991 civil rights 
proposals that became law is provided in: Mark Stern, "Party Alignments 
and Civil Rights, Then and Now," Paper presented at the 1992 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association . 
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stepped in their drive for the presidency. As he sought the Democratic 
presidential nomination, and then as he campaigned as the party's 
nominee, the symbols and associations of civil rights advocacy moved 
to the background of Clinton's campaign panoply. Civil rights was not 
to be a Clinton campaign issue. 
Contact with Jesse Jackson, the leading national civil rights 
proponent of the day, was perceived as hazardous by the Clinton 
election team. Association with Jackson was seen as strong civil rights 
advocacy. Throughout the 1992 election season, therefore, the Clinton 
campaign team kept Jackson as far away from its candidate as possible. 
In June, Clinton publicly detached himself from the Reverend Jesse 
Jackson's apparent support of extreme black nationalism when he, 
Clinton, condemned rap singer Sister Souljah's statement, "why not 
have a week to kill white people," at a meeting of the Jackson-led 
Rainbow Coalition. Sister Souljah had been invited to speak at the 
meeting the night before Clinton addressed the group, and Jesse Jackson 
sat in attendance as Clinton proceeded to attack his guest. Jackson was 
outraged and denounced Clinton's coming to the coalition meeting to 
"stage a well planned sneak attack, without the courage to confront but 
with a calculation to embarrass." Clinton's "Machiavellian maneuver," 
Jackson complained, " [ was intended] purely to appeal to conservative 
whites by containing Jackson and isolating Jackson." 24 But as a 
"Political Memo" column in the New York Times noted, "with his 
criticism of comments by Sister Souljah... [Clinton] accomplished 
much for his campaign. He ... distanced himself from the Rev. Jesse 
Jackson and spoke out only against reverse racism." The Governor 
argued he was "absolutely not" playing to racial intolerance with his 
remarks about Sister Souljah. "I grew up in a segregated society," he 
rejoined, "and I have devoted my public life to trying to overcome 
feelings of prejudice. "25 
Despite the lack of support for the Arkansas Governor by Jesse 
Jackson and the Rainbow Coalition, Clinton was generally perceived by 
liberal opinion-leaders as the Democratic advocate of civil rights.26 He 
couched his primary election appeal in terms of broad economic justice, 
employment, and getting the country to work. William Julius Wilson 
wrote in the New York Times, "Mr. Clinton has destroyed the myth 
that blacks will only respond if a candidate highlights race-specific 
issues and programs." Wilson argued that Clinton's general appeals of 
the need to help poor people and the need to get health coverage for all 
"has allowed blacks ... to identify with a candidate who addresses them 
24New York Times, June 14, June 17, June 19, 1992. 
25Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Deftly Navigates Shoals of Racial Issues," New 
York Times, June 17, 1992, p. 22. 
26
"Candidates Court Jackson Supporters," New York Times, January 26, 
1992 . 
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without narrowly focusing his message on race." 27 While Clinton's 
message appealed to middle-of-the-road whites--and, as Jackson 
suggested, perhaps some Reagan Democrats--the Arkansas Governor 
held his base of support among black Democratic voters. He received 
70 percent of all black votes cast in the Democratic primary elections 
while also holding on to 47 percent of the white Democratic primary 
votes. He was a "new kind of Democrat" and getting tangled up in 
debates about civil rights issues was not on his new Democratic agenda. 
When riots broke out in Los Angeles on May 1, 1992, after the 
"not guilty" finding in the Rodney King case, President Bush's response 
was initially muted. In a nationwide television address he spoke of the 
steps he was taking to restore order and expressed concern at "the 
brutality of [the] mob, pure and simple." He talked of his own lack of 
understanding of the verdict, but that it had to be respected as part of the 
justice process. "There's a difference," he argued, "between frustration 
with the law and direct assaults upon our legal system. In a civilized 
society, there can be no excuse ... [for the actions] that have terrorized 
the law abiding citizens of Los Angeles. "28 
Candidate Clinton's response to the Los Angeles riot was also 
initially muted, and evolved over a period of days . He first expressed 
sympathy and understanding for the rioters, as well as criticism that 
President Bush's "absence of action" on urban issues had fostered the 
situation that led to the rioting. But, the day after the rioting began the 
Governor also criticized the rioters as "lawless vandals. "29 The 
Governor renewed his attack on the administration after White House 
press secretary Marlin Fitzwater spoke of the riot being a result of the 
social welfare programs created by the Democrats in the 1960's and 
l 970's. Clinton scathingly attacked "twelve years of denial and neglect" 
of urban problems by the Reagan/Bush administrations. 30 On May 6, 
two days after Clinton's attack, the President toured the ravaged area and 
spoke of being "embarrassed by interracial violence and prejudice." He 
spoke of his own "sense of shame and sorrow at the destruction and 
horror of the events." He spoke of things being different in the 
future. 31 Thereafter, until late in the general election campaign, both 
candidates publicly down-played the Los Angeles riot and the issues it 
27William Julius Wilson, 'The Right Message," New York Times, March 
17, 1992. 
28
"Excerpts From Bush's Speech on Los Angeles Riots : 'Need to Restore 
Order,"' New York Times , May 2, 1992, p. 8. 
29Gwen Ifill, "Clinton's Reaction to Rioters Evolves ," New York Times, 
May 2, 1992, p. 9. 
30Robert Pear, "Clinton Assails G.O.P. 'Neglect ' as Riots' Cause, " May 
6, 1992, 1, 26. 
31Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Finds ' Horror' on Los Angeles Tour," New 
York Times, May 8, 1992, p. 1, 18. 
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brought forth. 
The 1992 Democratic National Convention was a love-in, with 
only minor words of dissent spoken by Jerry Brown, the last hold-out 
Democratic challenger to Mr. Clinton. Unlike the previous two 
Democratic conventions there were no bitter rules fights. The 1984 and 
1988 rules fights were waged "over how much leverage a black 
candidate, Jesse Jackson, would carry into the convention." 32 In 1992 
Jackson took himself out of the running for the presidency, and despite 
the vocal insistence by both him and his supporters, he was not 
seriously considered as a finalist for the vice-presidential slot on the 
Democratic ticket. Jackson spoke softly at the convention, and he told 
reporters that his role in the campaign had yet to be worked out. After 
the convention, the black leader commented: "There was this strategy 
[by Clinton] of distancing from labor, from cities and from the 
Rainbow. Distance is an innovative way of building a coalition. For 
Clinton to win a general election the strategy must be inclusive." 
That inclusiveness, as Jackson understood it, meant a major 
campaign role for himself and the Rainbow. 33 Jackson would campaign 
across the country to get out the Democratic vote, and occasionally 
spealc to Clinton on the telephone, but throughout the general election 
season Clinton maintained his public distance from Jackson. 34 At the 
September 9 annual meeting of the National Baptist Convention, Mr. 
Jackson, according to the New York Times, "sat stony behind Mr. 
Clinton as the Arkansas Governor received a warm reception from the 
religious group." Prior to the meeting stories had circulated that the 
two leaders were going to publicly get together and talk about the 
campaign, but what ensued was far from a public talk. The Times 
reported, "Mr. Jackson met Mr. Clinton briefly in a backstage restroom 
while more than a dozen clergymen milled around outside and guarded 
the doorway . Mr. Jackson said later that Mr. Clinton agreed to meet . 
with him next week to discuss voter registration. "35 That meeting 
never occurred. 36 Jackson had his public meeting with President-elect 
32Edsall and Edsall, p. 264. 
33
"Jackson Waits for Plan From Clinton," New York Times, July 18, 
1992, p.l, 9. 
34
"0n Sidelines of Presidential Race, Jackson Tums to Local 
Campaigns," New York Times, July 26, 1992, p. l; "Mississippi Trip 
Offers Jackson a Role," New York Times, July 28, 1992, p. 1; "Jackson to 
Join Democratic Drive," New York Times, September 4, 1992, p. 1. 
35New York Times, September 10, 1992. 
360n the Phil Donahue television show Clinton received criticism for 
not meeting with Jackson, but he responded, "I don't think you can judge me 
just on how many meetings I've had with Reverend Jackson." He indicated 
that he did speak with Jackson on the telephone . See: "Clinton and Gore 
Return to the 'Call-In,"' New York Times, October 7, 1992. 
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Clinton at the Governor's mansion in Little Rock on November 23, 
1992. 
The Clinton-Gore team played to the broad middle-class in its 
convention presentation and the campaign that followed . The 
convention film introduced the Democratic presidential nominee with an 
emphasis on his southern, relatively lower middle-class family, his 
hard-working mother, and his grit and determination to succeed. The 
nominee's acceptance speech noted: "In the name of those who do the 
work, pay the taxes, raise the kids, and play by the rules--in the name 
of the hard working who make up our forgotten middle class--1 proudly 
accept your nomination ." He reminded his audience, "I am a product of 
the middle class." 37 
On the last day of the convention, Ronald H. Brown, the publicly 
quiet, well-dressed, and now powerful chair of the Democratic National 
Committee, received three standing ovations from the party 's leaders. 
Brown had been a top Jackson adviser in 1988, but had helped dissuade 
him from going for the presidency in 1992. He had also helped 
persuade New York Governor Mario Cuomo, whose appeal to big city 
white ethnics was unassailable, to make the nominating speech for 
Governor Clinton.38 Brown's behind-the-scenes maneuvering had been 
instrumental in staging a harmonious Democratic National Convention-
-unknown in recent years--and in unifying support for the party's 
standard bearer .. Brown was an African-American who understood and 
succored the Clinton presidential strategy, and he now appeared 
consistently at stage center in the Democratic campaign of 1992. He 
was the kind of African-American Democrat that the Clinton campaign 
wanted the nation to see: a moderate, articulate, visible link to big-city 
Democrats and their African-American allies. 
On July 16, the last day of the Democratic convention, Ross Perot 
announced his withdrawal from the presidential race. The immediate 
beneficiary of this move was Bill Clinton. What had looked in June to 
be a close, three-way race for the presidency became, according to many 
immediate post-convention polls, a near-certain victory for Clinton. 
Clinton was now ahead of Bush by a 55 percent to 31 percent margin. 
The post-convention boost that came to most new presidential 
nominees was magnified for Clinton by the movement of Perot backers 
into his camp over Bush by a 45 percent to 25 percent margin. 39 Paul 
Tully, political director of the Democratic National Committee, 
remarked, "Perot's disappearance freed up a set of voters who are the 
37
"Democratic Convention Acceptance Speech," New York Times, July 
17, 1992, pp. 1, 10. 
38
"Ronald H. Brown Emerges as a Major Force," New York Times, July 
20, 1992, p. 1. 
39R. W. Apple, Jr ., "Poll Gives Clinton a Post-Perot, Post-Convention 
Boost, New York Times, July 18, 1992, p . 1. 
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angriest and most anti-Bush. "40 
The Clinton-Gore team was talcing no chances with their new 
cushion of support. Several days after the convention ended they 
embarked on an eight-state bus tour of mostly small-town America. In 
a major Texas speech the Democratic presidential contender stated, 
"Four years ago this crime issue was used to divide America. I want to 
be tough on crime and good for civil rights. You can't have civil 
justice without order and safety."41 Clinton's signing of death warrants 
as Governor of Arkansas had aroused antagonism among many liberal 
leaders, but it lent credibility to his call for being tough on crime. The 
middle-class remained in focus for him. The Democratic nominee's 
general election strategy was clear-cut, and expressed succinctly in a 
sign at his Little Rock headquarters: "Change vs. more of the same. 
The economy, stupid. Don't forget health care. "42 
The Republican National Convention of 1992 reflected the disarray 
and antagonisms which pervaded Bush's reelection campaign from its 
start. It also reflected what appeared to be the President's hesitancy to 
enter the campaign fray. The first two days of the convention were 
turned over to the radical right. Their members, led by Pat Buchanan on 
prime time television, spewed forth ideological anger, disdain for 
cultural diversity, an absolutist anti-abortion position, and a 
fundamentalist vision of morality. The speeches had not been cleared 
by the White House.43 
The GOP platform was as extreme as the Democratic party 
platform was moderate. 44 The media and public reaction to this 
outpouring of rancor was incredulity and dismay. The President's forces 
regained control by the third day of the convention. Bush's acceptance 
speech was a paean to his foreign policy leadership, a call for family 
and traditional values, and a plea to judge each candidate on the basis of 
his character. On civil rights , which Clinton had passed over with 
40 11Polls Seem to Offer Respite, But Clinton Pushes Pace," New York 
Times July 26, 1992, p.22. 
41
"Clinton in Houston Speech Assails Bush on Crime Issue," New York 
Times, July 24, 1992, p. 13. See also: New York Times, July 21, 1992, p. 
1. 
42Michael Kelly, "Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush Gains, " New 
York Times, October 31, 1992, 1. 
43 See, for example, the following: Ross K. Baker, ''The Presidential 
Nominations," in Gerald M. Pomper, et al., The Election of 1992 (Chatham, 
N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1993), pp. 65-68; Ryan J. Barilleaux and 
Randall E. Adkins, "The Nominations: Process and Patterns," in Michael 
Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1992 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), 
pp. 52-54; Paul J. Quirk and John K. Dalager, ''The Election : A ' New 
Democrat,"' in Nelson, ed., pp. 69-70; and, New York Times, August 13-
21, 1992. 
44New York Times, August 13, 15, 18, 1992. 
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quick broad strokes of support, Bush's words were also few: "we 
strengthened our civil rights laws, and we did it without resorting to 
quotas." 45 In 1988 the "Willie Horton" ad captured the public's 
attention with its implicit interweaving of liberalism, crime, civil 
rights advocacy and race. In 1992 the Bush campaign retreated from its 
aggressive anti-affirmative action and anti-quotas position. The 
President repeated, time after time, that he supported civil rights and he 
supported the compromise employment bill, "without quotas," that he 
had signed into law. 
Ross Perot's reentry into the campaign on October 1 helped to 
narrow Clinton's lead in the polls and raised concerns that neither 
major-party candidate would secure an electoral college majority. 
However, Perot's return did not appear to substantia11y alter the issue 
positions of the major-party nominees. 
The only time civil rights was again brought up in a forthright 
manner was during the presidential debates. In the October 11 debate 
the candidates were asked about "racial division .... Why is this still 
happening in America and what would you do to end it?" None of the 
respondents mentioned any specific proposals. Perot responded that 
"during political campaigns I would urge everybody to stop trying to 
split this country into fragments and appeal to the differences between 
us .... We ought to love one another because united teams win and 
divided teams lose." He never moved afar from this approach . Clinton 
emphasized his growing up in the South and his having seen "the winds 
of hatred divide people and keep the people of my state poorer than they 
would have been, both spiritually and economically ." He continued in 
a vague and non-commital tone for the remainder of his response. Bush 
answered: "I've tried to use the White House as the bully pulpit, 
speaking out against discrimination. We've passed two very forward-
looking civil rights bills. [Bush referred to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act as a civil rights bill.] It's not going to be all done by 
legislation .... "46 
At the second debate the candidates were asked, "when do you 
estimate your party will both nominate and elect an Afro-American and 
female ticket to the Presidency of the United States?" This was the 
only civil-rights-related question asked during this debate. All three 
candidates answered rather innocuously. George Bush's initial response, 
"I think if Barbara Bush were running this year she'd be elected," drew 
the most laughs and the most attention after the debate ended. No one 
else responded to the question with any specific proposals.47 
45
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At the third debate the President was asked, "let's move to some of 
the leadership concerns that have been voiced about you... that you 
began to focus on the economy, on health care, on racial divisions in 
this country only after they became crises. Is that a fair criticism?" The 
President responded that, "I don't think that's a fair shot." He proceeded 
to respond to the civil rights section of the query by citing his support 
for "the Americans with Disabilities Act, which I think is one of the 
foremost pieces of civil rights legislation. And yes, it took me to veto 
two civil rights quota bills, because I don't believe in quotas, and I don't 
think the American people believe in quotas." He continued, "I beat the 
Congress on that, and then we passed a decent civil rights bill that 
offers guarantees against discrimination in employment and that is 
good." He never talked about the Los Angeles riots. Perot passed on 
answering the question. Clinton talked about the economy. He never 
directly addressed the section of the question which dealt with race 
relations and crises. 48 Race relations and civil rights were not issues 
that these candidates wished to address in the 1992 presidential 
campaign. 
The "Outsiders" and Civil Rights as a "Non-Issue" 
When the votes were counted Bill Clinton had been elected 
President with 43.3 percent of the total votes cast, while George Bush 
won 37.7 percent and Ross Perot received 19 percent Clinton won 83 
percent of the black vote, and he carried 39 percent of the white vote, 
while Bush won but 10 percent of the black vote while carrying 40 
percent of the white vote.49 The aversion of the candidates to deal with 
the race issue was reflected in the lack of interest that the mass public 
held for the issue on election day. When asked in the CBS News/New 
York Times exit poll, "Which issues mattered most in deciding how 
you voted?," less than five percent of the respondents indicated race or 
civil rights as an answer. By a wide margin, the .related issues of the 
economy and jobs, followed by health care, were most salient. Civil 
rights or race were not mentioned as one of the top ten concerns.so 
Personality explained two and a half times more of the variance in the 
1988 presidential election outcome than did policy issues. In 1992, 
policy evaluations explained seven times more of the variance in the 
outcome than did personality.SI Thus, while policy was at stage center 
48New York Times, October 20, 1992. 
49Election results cited here are from the CBS News/New York Times 
Exit Poll as cited in Quirk and Dalager, p. 78. For a brief, but insightful 
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in the 1992 elections, civil rights policy was not among the issues that 
swayed voters. Civil rights had become a "non-issue." It had been 
effectively kept out of the public issue agenda in the 1992 presidential 
election campaign. 
Bill Clinton understood the damage wrought upon the Democratic 
coalition by the civil rights issue. He lived in the South and he saw 
the transformation of the region's politics as whites increasingly 
deserted the party of Jefferson and Jackson during the 1960's, 1970's, 
and 1980's in response to the primacy of civil rights issues on the 
campaign agenda. He was determined not to repeat the tactical mistakes 
of his Democratic predecessors and let race issues divide the party in 
1992. He maintained his distance from Jesse Jackson and other 
aggressive public advocates of civil rights, while assuring black and 
white voters that he understood their needs. He stayed focused on the 
economy and he argued that the incumbent president bore the 
responsibility for its poor condition. That was Clinton's campaign 
strategy from the outset in 1992 and he carried it out. 
Almost every political observer has agreed that the election of 1992 
became a referendum on George Bush and his handling of the 
economy .52 Aside from a push for traditional morality and a call for 
"family values," the Bush campaign did not pursue a New Right 
strategy in 1992. The President did not seriously attempt to interject 
race, the most powerfully divisive issue for the Democratic coalition in 
recent years, into the 1992 campaign . In essence the Clinton forces 
defined the campaign and the Bush-GOP camp did not retaliate with 
their most powerful issue: race . 
Perhaps the fight over the 1991 Civil Rights Act moved the 
President away from pursuing this issue any further. Perhaps the death 
of campaign strategist Lee Atwater left the Bush campaign staff without 
a combative street-fighter who would do whatever it took to win. Pat 
Buchanan was more than willing to take the race issue on but he was 
kept at arm's length from the Bush camp. There was apparently no 
comparable person available and positioned to do what Atwater had done 
in 1988. Neither party was willing to take the polar position or pursue 
serious debate about civil rights and the Democratic nominee was the 
beneficiary of this default. Thus, civil rights became a "non-issue." 
E. E. Schattschneider would perhaps suggest that what may have 
been good for Bill Clinton and the Democrats may not have been good 
for the democratic polity or one of its weakest groups , African-
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Americans. Democratic politics, to Schattschneider, is about the 
socialization of conflict, the organizing into the public sphere of the 
private battles that have kept the less-well-off in their place. He notes, 
"every change in the scope of conflict has a bias; it is partisan in its 
nature. "53 In this case, the bias mitigated against public discussion of a 
crucial issue. Of course, it may well be that over the long run, as 
Clinton's allies argue and Edsall and Edsall imply, the muting of civil 
rights in the 1992 presidential campaign may redound to the benefit of 
those individuals who would normally want to play it out in the open 
political arena. Without the silencing of civil rights, the Clinton forces 
assert, they may well not have won the presidency and be in a position 
to use their powers in support of the issue. Yet this administration 
backed away from its first major thrust in the area, the nomination of 
Lani Guinier, a strong and controversial civil rights advocate, as 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 54 After a year in office, 
the administration had yet to name another nominee for the position. 
The "outsiders" were silenced during the campaign and their voice has 
yet to emerge with major effect within this administration. 
53Schattschneider, p. 4. 
540n the Guinier nomination fiasco see: New York Times, June 3, 4, 
1993. 
Volume 22, 1994 I 91 
